Processes governing the creation, perception and production of spoken words are sensitive to the patterns of speech sounds in the language user’s lexicon. Generative linguistic theory suggests that listeners infer constraints on possible sound patterning from the lexicon and apply these constraints to all aspects of word use. In contrast, emergentist accounts suggest that these phonotactic constraints are a product of interactive associative mapping with items in the lexicon. To determine the degree to which phonotactic constraints are lexically mediated, we (...) observed the effects of learning new words that violate English phonotactic constraints on phonotactic perceptual repair processes in nonword consonant-consonant-vowel stimuli. Subjects who learned such words were less likely to “repair” illegal onset clusters and report them as legal ones. Effective connectivity analyses of MRI-constrained reconstructions of simultaneously collected magnetoencephalography and EEG data showed that these behavioral shifts were accompanied by changes in the strength of influences of lexical areas on acoustic-phonetic areas. These results strengthen the interpretation of previous results suggesting that phonotactic constraints on perception are produced by top-down lexical influences on speech processing. (shrink)

Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.

This paper will first examine the different versions of social or socialized epistemology, a field that has gathered much support among epistemologists in recent years. After the necessary classification, the paper goes on to suggest that socialized epistemology could benefit from contemporary social theory, and Derek Layder's views are presented as especially fruitful in this respect. To give grounds for this suggestion, features of Layder's theory will be contrasted with certain shortcomings in 'conservative' and 'feminist' versions of socialized epistemology.

Tony Lawson, Sandra Harding, Drucilla K. Barker, Fabienne Peter and Julie A. Nelson have recently debated the merits and demerits of critical realism as the basis of feminist social research. Yet the dialogue is left unfinished, with no clear agreement attained. Some key features of that failure are analysed in this article. It is suggested that, despite shared support for explicitly post-positivistic stances, critical realists and post-structuralist feminists cannot gain much from a dialogue that proceeds like this one. Other modes (...) of discussion should be looked for. One more promising basis for such discussion - a question-driven approach to social scientific explanation - is introduced at the end of the article. (shrink)

Tony Lawson, Sandra Harding, Drucilla K. Barker, Fabienne Peter and Julie A. Nelson have recently debated the merits and demerits of critical realism as the basis of feminist social research. Yet the dialogue is left unfinished, with no clear agreement attained. Some key features of that failure are analysed in this article. It is suggested that, despite shared support for explicitly post-positivistic stances, critical realists and post-structuralist feminists cannot gain much from a dialogue that proceeds like this one. Other modes (...) of discussion should be looked for. One more promising basis for such discussion - a question-driven approach to social scientific explanation - is introduced at the end of the article. (shrink)

This book offers a concise exposition of the content theory of intentionality, which lies at the root of Husserl’s phenomenology, for student and scholar. Originally published in 1982. The first part traces the history of phenomenology from its beginnings in Aristotle and Aquinas through Hume, Reid and the Brentano school to its first clear formulation in Frege and Husserl. Part two analyses some special problems involved in two important types of mental phenomena – perception and emotion – without abandoning the (...) historical approach. Husserl’s theory of perception is extensively discussed and a Husserlian analysis of so-called de re acts is attempted. (shrink)

Especially in functional-typological linguistics, semantic roles have been studied thoroughly, because they constitute a good starting point for any study on argument marking due to their semantically defined nature. However, the very concept of semantic roles is far from being without problems, and there is still no consensus on how the roles are best defined. In this volume, the notion will be discussed from novel perspectives with the aim of providing new insights into our understanding of semantic roles. Two of (...) the papers deal with semantic role clusters, one with semantic roles in verbless constructions, one with diachrony of semantic roles and two with individual semantic roles that have not been studied in too much detail in previous studies. The book may not offer answers to all questions the readers may have, but at least it raises interesting further questions relevant to arriving at a better understanding of semantic roles. Originally published in Studies in Language Vol. 38:3 (2014). (shrink)

: "Pure, applied and empirical" : Ferdinand Tönnies' system of sociology proper.

This book offers a concise exposition of the content theory of intentionality, which lies at the root of Husserl’s phenomenology, for student and scholar. Originally published in 1982. The first part traces the history of phenomenology from its beginnings in Aristotle and Aquinas through Hume, Reid and the Brentano school to its first clear formulation in Frege and Husserl. Part two analyses some special problems involved in two important types of mental phenomena – perception and emotion – without abandoning the (...) historical approach. Husserl’s theory of perception is extensively discussed and a Husserlian analysis of so-called _de re_ acts is attempted. (shrink)

Veber's theory of value is based on his general classification of mental phenomena. Value-experiences constitute a special variety of emotional experiences: they have a pseudo-cognitive role; that is, they "perceive" values just as ordinary presentations perceive things and their properties. Veber also makes several distinctions between different types of value-perceiving emotions. Finally he discusses the kinds of objective correlates that these experiences have and thereby distinguishes between three types of value: thing-value, person-value and hagiological value. He may be criticised for (...) inconsistency, because he starts f r om the descriptive standpoint but ends up by legislating on how we ought to value persons. (shrink)

Veber's theory of value is based on his general classification of mental phenomena. Value-experiences constitute a special variety of emotional experiences: they have a pseudo-cognitive role; that is, they "perceive" values just as ordinary presentations perceive things and their properties. Veber also makes several distinctions between different types of value-perceiving emotions. Finally he discusses the kinds of objective correlates that these experiences have and thereby distinguishes between three types of value: thing-value, person-value and hagiological value. He may be criticised for (...) inconsistency, because he starts f r om the descriptive standpoint but ends up by legislating on how we ought to value persons. (shrink)

Meinong had problems with reality: when having an experience, one cannot tell whether its object is real or not. The problem surfaced in many contexts but it was always connected with the notion of presentation {Vorstellung). This concept, as used in the Austrian phenomenological tradition, is ambiguous: a presentation can be (1) the neutral content that is a part of any mental act, or (2) the act of mere presentation, i.e. the combination of a content and the psychological mode of (...) mere entertaining, or (3) the act of perceiving a simple object.Meinong's pupil France Veber first adopted an orthodox Meinongian view of presentation but later he became aware of the problems connected with it. He argued that there are mental acts in which the subject is in direct contact with reahty or, as he put it, "hits" reality. Thus, acts of perception have two functions, those of presenting and "hitting".It is argued, first, that there are interesting parallels between Veber's concept of zadevanje Chitting') and modem theories of direct mental reference, de re acts and indexicality; and second, that although Veber correctly saw the problem, his solution is not quite satisfactory, because he thought that one has to abandon phenomenology (or the theory of objects) in order to account for the experience of hitting reality. A thoroughly phenomenological theory of „hitting" may be possible, after all. (shrink)

Meinong had problems with reality: when having an experience, one cannot tell whether its object is real or not. The problem surfaced in many contexts but it was always connected with the notion of presentation {Vorstellung). This concept, as used in the Austrian phenomenological tradition, is ambiguous: a presentation can be (1) the neutral content that is a part of any mental act, or (2) the act of mere presentation, i.e. the combination of a content and the psychological mode of (...) mere entertaining, or (3) the act of perceiving a simple object.Meinong's pupil France Veber first adopted an orthodox Meinongian view of presentation but later he became aware of the problems connected with it. He argued that there are mental acts in which the subject is in direct contact with reahty or, as he put it, "hits" reality. Thus, acts of perception have two functions, those of presenting and "hitting".It is argued, first, that there are interesting parallels between Veber's concept of zadevanje Chitting') and modem theories of direct mental reference, de re acts and indexicality; and second, that although Veber correctly saw the problem, his solution is not quite satisfactory, because he thought that one has to abandon phenomenology (or the theory of objects) in order to account for the experience of hitting reality. A thoroughly phenomenological theory of „hitting" may be possible, after all. (shrink)

Traditional moral theories appear to be unable to give a credible account of the relationship between deontic and axiological concepts, i.e. duty and value. Of the two traditional solutions to this problem, one emphasises the independence of the two realms, whereas Mill argues that duty is definable in terms of goodness. In this paper I present Meinong's Law of Omission which offers, in my opinion, a promising alternative to these two traditional views.

Traditional moral theories appear to be unable to give a credible account of the relationship between deontic and axiological concepts, i.e. duty and value. Of the two traditional solutions to this problem, one emphasises the independence of the two realms, whereas Mill argues that duty is definable in terms of goodness. In this paper I present Meinong's Law of Omission which offers, in my opinion, a promising alternative to these two traditional views.

This paper examines and defends von Wright's view of moral value, put forward in his book The Varieties of Goodness (1963). He holds that moral value is not a primary value like instrumental, technical, utilitarian, medical, or hedonic value, but a secondary or second-level one which is based on a combination of primary values. Human actions and intentions are the only bearers of moral value, and they are morally valuable because they protect and promote some set of primary values. It (...) is argued that the same account (i) applies also to juridical value, and (ii) can be used to throw some light on the problem of defining the three competing schools of legal philosophy, viz. legal positivism, natural law theory, and legal constructivism. (shrink)

Inleidend overzicht van de wijsgerige ethiek.

The idea of replication is based on the premise that there are permanent laws to be replicated and verified, and the scientific method is adequate for doing so. Scientific truth, however, is not absolute but relative to time and context, and the method used. Time and context are inextricably interwoven, in that time creates different contexts and contexts (e.g., Christmas Day vs. New Year’s Day) create different experiences of time, rendering psychological phenomena inherently variable. This means that internal and external (...) conditions fluctuate and are different in a replication study vs. the original. Thus, a replication experiment is just another empirical investigation that has no special status in the establishment of scientific truth. It is not the final arbiter of whether or not something exists. In their pursuit of homogeneous external conditions, replications have ignored the homogeneity of internal conditions. There is not a single replication reported in the literature that would have shown participants’ feelings and thoughts—both conscious and nonconscious—to be identical to those of the original participants. Experimental instructions can create varying ratios of conscious over nonconscious processing from one study to another. Ironically, every replication is a failure at the fundamentals of human psychology. While patterns can be discovered, they are not permanent or unchangeable laws of human behavior to be proven by the pinpoint statistical verification through replication. As scientific knowledge in physics is temporary and incomplete, should it be any surprise that science can only provide “temporary winners” for psychological knowledge of human behavior? (shrink)

인간의 이성적 의식과 법의 관계를 밝히고 법의 해석 과 판단에 인간의 의식이 어떻게 작용하는가를 고찰 한 저술. 제1부에서는 법의 형이상학적인 측면에서 법의 실체, 그리스의 법, 데카르트의 법, 로크와 법, 칸트와 법, 헤겔과 법, 아담스미스의 법의 경제, 중국의 도덕과 법사상을 다루었다. 제2부에서는 심리학적 분석으로 헌법의 심리학적 해석, 법의 판결절차, 증거법, 형법과 죄, 청소년과 가족법, 조세법, 플라톤의 법, 칸트의 도덕론의 경험적 확인, 헤겔의 자아와 노동법, 법의 4차원에 대해 다뤘다.

George Berkeley is one of the greatest and most influential modern philosophers. In defending the immaterialism for which he is most famous, he redirected modern thinking about the nature of objectivity and the mind's capacity to come to terms with it. Along the way, he made striking and influential proposals concerning the psychology of the senses, the workings of language, the aims of science, and the scope of mathematics. In this Companion volume a team of distinguished authors not only examines (...) Berkeley's achievements but also his neglected contributions to moral and political philosophy, his writings on economics and development, and his defense of religious commitment and religious life. The volume places Berkeley's achievements in the context of the many social and intellectual traditions - philosophical, scientific, ethical, and religious - to which he fashioned a distinctive response. (shrink)

The introduction of novel diagnostic techniques in clinical domains such as genomics and radiology has led to a rich ethical debate on how to handle unsolicited findings that result from these innovations. Yet while unsolicited findings arise in both genomics and radiology, most of the relevant literature to date has tended to focus on only one of these domains. In this article, we synthesize and critically assess similarities and differences between “scanning the body” and “sequencing the genome” from an ethical (...) perspective. After briefly describing the novel diagnostic contexts leading to unsolicited findings, we synthesize and reflect on six core ethical issues that relate to both specialties: terminology; benefits and risks; autonomy; disclosure of unsolicited findings to children; uncertainty; and filters and routine screening. We identify ethical rationales that pertain to both fields and may contribute to more ethically sound policies. Considerations of preserving public trust and ensuring that people perceive healthcare policies as fair also support the need for a combined debate. (shrink)